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Abstract—Gradient-based adversarial attacks on
neural networks can be crafted in a variety of ways
by varying either how the attack algorithm relies on
the gradient, the network architecture used for crafting
the attack, or both. Most recent work has focused on
defending classifiers in a case where there is no uncer-
tainty about the attacker’s behavior (i.e., the attacker
is expected to generate a specific attack using a specific
network architecture). However, if the attacker is not
guaranteed to behave in a certain way, the literature
lacks methods in devising a strategic defense. We fill
this gap by simulating the attacker’s noisy perturbation
using a variety of attack algorithms based on gradi-
ents of various classifiers. We perform our analysis
using a pre-processing Denoising Autoencoder (DAE)
defense that is trained with the simulated noise. We
demonstrate significant improvements in post-attack
accuracy, using our proposed ensemble-trained defense,
compared to a situation where no effort is made to
handle uncertainty.
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, pre-processing
defense, transferability, black box scenario, denoising
autoencoder.
I. Introduction
ADVERSARIAL attacks on neural networks pose aserious threat to safety-critical systems that rely on
the high accuracies of these neural networks. The imper-
ceptibility of additive evasion attacks makes it difficult to
even detect their existence. Recent work has attempted to
tackle this issue by designing defenses against such attacks,
mostly focusing on a scenario where the assumption is
that the attacker has significant knowledge of the victim
classifier, and hence will design an attack to optimally
destroy the accuracy of that particular classifier. However,
there is no guarantee that the attacker will choose to
do so. Furthermore, adversarial examples transfer across
classifiers, and an adversary could take advantage of this
property by crafting an attack based on a different classi-
fier. The attacker would do this when having only partial
knowledge about the victim classifier, or when attempting
to confuse the defender on purpose. Alternatively, another
scenario is that the attacker is limited in computational
resources, and may be trying to attack multiple classifiers
at once. This is why they would tailor the attack to
only one classifier, and use that to attack all classifiers.
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Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the sensitivity of
the defense to the data used to train it, especially in the
architecture mismatch case (i.e., when the architecture of
the target classifier differs from the architecture of the
adversary’s classifier), since traditional strategies may not
suffice [1].
In a defense-blind scenario, we investigate strategies to
combat adversarial attacks in the presence of uncertainty
about the classifier’s architecture whose gradients were
used to generate the attacks. We also tackle the uncer-
tainty caused by the variability of the attack algorithm
by considering three established attacks. We empirically
demonstrate the effectiveness of using an ensemble
of noise simulations corresponding to all possible
attacks for training a pre-processing Denoising
Autoencoder (DAE).
Related Work: Many existing methods to combat ad-
versarial attacks assume that such attacks are specifically
crafted using the gradient of the victim model. Often, these
methods are, without modification, employed to mitigate
attacks generated using a disparate classifier’s gradient
with less success than in the case where the attack is
based on the victim classifier’s gradient [2]. For example,
defenses based on Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
[3], autoencoder-based dimensionality reduction [4], [5],
and denoising autoencoders [5] suffer a severe degradation
of performance in architecture mismatch settings. Recent
work has proposed training multiple DAEs (for filtering
instead of dimensionality reduction) and randomly select-
ing one as a defense at test time [6]. While this may be
effective in confusing the attacker, these DAEs have only
been tested against very mild attacks.
The idea of natural noise simulation has been exten-
sively investigated before the successful application of deep
learning over the past decade. For example, in [7], a noise
compensation strategy is studied for speech recognition to
accommodate common scenarios where training and test
noises can emanate from different environments. Also, in
[8], an early example for a pre-processing denoising recur-
rent network that precedes a time delay neural network
was introduced. Further, in [9], multiple noise simulations
were performed for robust speaker identification. Recently,
using the new deep learning tools for simulating and
filtering noise has also been investigated, particularly for
speech processing (see e.g., [10], [11]). Simulating adversar-
ial noise and directly using it for training the final classifier
(a.k.a. adversarial training [12]) has been investigated
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2in multiple settings (see e.g., [13], [14], [15]), including
settings where adversarial noise is used to model worst
case scenarios for natural noise (see e.g., [16], [17]).
To our knowledge, when adversarial noise is used to
model an attacker’s perturbation, there has been little
work in studying the transferability of defenses, partic-
ularly those relying on simulating adversarial noise. In
an attempt to discuss the transferability of a particular
defense across multiple neural networks, [18] emphasizes
that using a DAE is superior to adversarial training be-
cause a DAE requires training only once but can mitigate
attacks on multiple classifiers that are trained to perform
the same task. Using adversarial training would require
retraining each of those classifiers. Not requiring classifier
retraining could offer significant advantages in terms of
computational cost and enabling applications (see e.g.,
[19]). Given that the autoencoder defense is a transferable
defense, our work attempts to determine how to best train
it, when there is uncertainty about the gradient used
to generate the attack and about the attack algorithm.
Further, the ultimate goal is not to achieve robustness
for a particular classifier, but to achieve robustness for
a particular task. In that light, [20] proposes training
multiple classifiers to perform the same task and choosing
one or more of them at test time, since it is difficult
for the adversary to generate attacks using gradients of
multiple classifiers. Also, they add a small Gaussian noise
to the trained weights of the classifiers. However, randomly
selecting one of many trained networks to perform the
classification task and/or using majority vote neither pre-
vents the adversarial examples from transferring to each
of those trained networks, nor does it address the problem
of uncertainty about the attack algorithm used by the
adversary. Our work addresses both of these problems.
Specifically, it addresses uncertainty about both the attack
algorithm and the network whose gradients are used to
generate the attack.
II. Procedure
We use a DAE as a defense, as explained in Algorithm
1. To generate data for DAE training, we consider two
sources of variation: the attack algorithm and the classifier
architecture whose gradients are used. For the attack
algorithms, we consider three possibilities: Carlini-Wagner
(CW) [21], which is known for robustness, DeepFool (DF)
[22], which adds a very small perturbation, and Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) [23], which enjoys computational
efficiency. The CW attack minimizes the sum of the
perturbation and a scaled cost function J˜(·) to find the
optimum value of a variable w
minimize c · J˜(x′) + ||x′ − x||22, (1)
where J˜(x′) is a cost function - very similar to cross-
entropy - that penalizes the sample classification as the
true label t:
J˜(x′) = max{Z(x′)t −max
i 6=t
Z(x′)i, 0}, (2)
and x′ = σ(w) is given by the sigmoid function, Z(·)i is the
input to the ith neuron of the softmax layer. The constant
c is chosen to be the smallest value such that J˜(x∗) = 0,
where x∗ is the solution. Gradient descent with multiple
random starting points is used to find the solution.
Algorithm 1 We first extend the list xadv to include
data xtrain that is attacked using every attack algorithm
attack_alg from the list list_attack_alg, using gradi-
ents of every network with weights wmodel from the list
list_w_model. A random permutation of indices from 1
to the sum of the lengths of xtrain and xadv, shuf_idx,
is then found. Next, a DAE is trained with a combina-
tion of xtrain and xadv, to produce as target output the
corresponding clean data from xtrain, both of which are
shuffled according to shuf_idx, to maintain consistency
in order. To use this DAE as a defense, the function
test_time_defense forward propagates the test data xtest
through the trained DAE with weights wdae, to obtain the
reconstructed approximation of clean data.
Function: dae_generator
Input: xtrain, list _attack_alg, list_w_model
xadv = []
for attack_alg in list_attack_alg :
for wmodel in list_wmodel :
xadv.extend(attack_alg(xtrain, wmodel))
shuf_idx = rand(len([xtrain, xadv]))
wdae = train_dae(
input = shuffle([xtrain, xadv], idx = shuf_idx),
target = shuffle([xtrain] ∗ len(xadv)len(xtrain) + 1, idx =
shuf_idx))
return wdae
Function: test_time_defense
Input: xtest
return wdae.fprop(xtest)
The DF attack tries to find a perturbed sample xi+1
from xi by iteratively approximating the classifiers to be
linear, and finding the minimum l2-norm perturbation
that leads to misclassification. Let xi be the sample at the
ith iteration, x0 = x, C∗(x0) be the true label, and fk(x)
be the identity indicator for whether sample x is classified
to belong to class k. The perturbation added at iteration
i is:
|f ′l |
||w′l ||22
w
′
l , (3)
where
l = argmin
k 6=C∗(x0)
|f ′k|
||w′k||22
, (4)
w
′
k = 5fk(xi)−5fC∗(x0)(xi), (5)
and
f
′
k = fk(xi)− fC∗(x0)(xi). (6)
This continues till misclassification, or for a certain num-
ber of iterations. In our experiments, this number is 50.
3The FGS attack adds a perturbation proportional to
the sign of the gradient of the cost function J(θ, x, y) with
respect to the input. This perturbation is l2-bounded.
x˜() = x+  ∗ 5xJ(θ, x, y)|| 5x J(θ, x, y)||2 . (7)
For the classifier architecture on which the attacks
are based, the two architecture types considered are
Fully Connected (FC) and Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN). Only a CNN is considered for the CIFAR-10
classification task, as it is difficult to solve with an FC
classifier.
A. Experimental Setup
The MNIST-Digit and CIFAR-10 datasets were used
for classification of 28×28 and 32×32 pixel images, re-
spectively, into one of 10 classes. For fully connected
networks, we use the notation FC-n1-n2-...-nl to denote
that layer i has ni neurons, for i ∈ {1, · · · , l}. The
MNIST victim FC network has architecture FC-784-100-
100-10, achieving an accuracy of 98.11%, and the MNIST
adversary’s FC network has architecture FC-784-200-100-
100-10. Each layer has a Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
activation, except the final layer which has softmax. The
MNIST adversary’s CNN architecture is shown in Table I.
The MNIST victim CNN achieves an accuracy of 98.66%,
and has a similar architecture to the adversary’s, but with
only two convolutional layers, followed by a softmax layer.
The CIFAR-10 victim CNN, shown in Table II, achieves
an accuracy of 90.44%. Note that ELU and BatchNorm
refer to Exponential Linear Unit activation and Batch
Normalization, respectively. Also, note that the notation
(Conv 3x3x32, ELU, BatchNorm)x2 refers to using two
consecutive sequences of a convolutional layer followed by
ELU activation and Batch Normalization. To obtain varia-
tions of this architecture to train the CIFAR-10 defense, an
extra (Conv 3x3xz, ELU, BatchNorm) sequence is added
after the second, fourth, or sixth such sequence, where z is
the number of filters in the convolutional layer preceding
the first added convolutional layer. These variations are
used only to train the defense, and not to generate attacks
to test the defense against. The adversary’s architecture
is obtained by adding such a sequence after the eighth
such sequence. Data augmentation was performed prior
to feeding the CIFAR-10 data into the CNN, through
rotations of up to 15 degrees, width/height shifts of up
to 10% of the original, and horizontal flips1.
B. Approach
We evaluate the defense sensitivity to the choice of
attacked data used for training by varying the architecture
and attack algorithm. To train the DAE with data per-
turbed according to the FGS attack, the l2 norm was cho-
sen such that the perturbation is simultaneously ef-
fective and reasonably imperceptible in the attacked
1Details about the denoising autoencoders and training details for
all networks can be found in Appendix.
Conv 3x3x32, ReLU
Conv 3x3x64, ReLU
Max Pool 2x2
Dropout (rate = 0.25)
FC (128 neurons), ReLU
Dropout (rate = 0.5)
Softmax (10 classes)
TABLE I: MNIST adversary’s CNN architecture.
(Conv 3x3x32, ELU, BatchNorm)x2
Max Pool 2x2, Dropout (rate = 0.2)
(Conv 3x3x64, ELU, BatchNorm)x2
Max Pool 2x2, Dropout (rate = 0.3)
(Conv 3x3x128, ELU, BatchNorm)x2
Max Pool 2x2, Dropout (rate = 0.4)
(Conv 3x3x128, ELU, BatchNorm)x2
Max Pool 2x2, Dropout (rate = 0.4)
Softmax (10 classes)
TABLE II: CIFAR-10 victim CNN architecture.
Fig. 1: MNIST-Digit images attacked with the FGS al-
gorithm. The upper row has unperturbed images. The
middle row has images perturbed using gradients of an
FC classifier with l2 norm 2.5. The bottom row has images
perturbed using gradients of a CNN classifier with l2 norm
1.5.
Fig. 2: Images from the CIFAR-10 dataset attacked with
the FGS algorithm with an l2 norm of 1.7. The upper
row has unperturbed images. The lower row has perturbed
images.
images. For the MNIST-Digit dataset, this was achieved
by using an l2-norm of 1.5 when using gradients from a
CNN, and an l2-norm of 2.5 when using gradients from
an FC network, as shown in Figure 1. For the CIFAR-10
dataset, an l2 norm of 1.7 delivered reasonably impercep-
tibly attacked images, as shown in Figure 2. We say that
the defense is <architecture-type>-trained or <attack>-
trained to refer to the architecture type or attack algo-
rithm used to simulate the perturbations, respectively.
Further, we say that the defense is ensemble-architecture-
type-trained or ensemble-attack-trained when both FC and
CNN architectures or when all three attack algorithms are
4used to simulate the perturbations, respectively2.
1) Varying the Architecture Type: Here, we vary the
architecture type used to train the defense for a particular
attack type. For each attack, we trained two defenses using
gradients of one architecture type, and one defense trained
using gradients of an ensemble of both architecture types.
We only performed this with the MNIST-Digit dataset,
since the architecture type cannot be varied with the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
2) Varying the Attack Algorithm: Next, we trained the
defense with data attacked using gradients of a particular
architecture type while varying the attack algorithm used.
For the MNIST-Digit dataset, we used an FC architec-
ture.With the CIFAR-10 dataset, we took a step further
and trained the defense with data that is attacked using
gradients from an ensemble of classifiers with varying CNN
architectures.
III. Results
1) Performance Metric: We first measure the accuracy
improvement as the pre-defense accuracy subtracted from
the post-defense accuracy. We then compute the percent
increase in accuracy improvement when using the pro-
posed defense from that when using traditional defenses:
%increase in accuracy improvement = p− t
abs(t) ∗ 100, (8)
where p is the accuracy improvement when using our
proposed defense, and t is the average accuracy improve-
ment when using all traditional defenses for which the
attacker’s choice of architecture type (or attack) was
not involved. When we vary the architecture type, the
traditional defense considered is the defense trained with
the same attack as the attacker’s, based on an architecture
type different from the attacker’s. In the absence of an
attack while varying the architecture type, the traditional
defenses considered are the two defenses trained with
a particular attack based on a single architecture type.
When we vary the attack algorithm, the traditional de-
fenses considered are the two defenses trained with an
attack algorithm different from the attacker’s, and the one
defense trained using the two attack algorithms that the
attacker did not use. In the absence of an attack while
varying the attack algorithm, the traditional defenses
considered are the three defenses trained with one attack
each, and the three defenses trained with an ensemble of
two attacks.
2) Varying the Architecture Type: In most cases, our
ensemble-architecture-type-trained defense improves the
accuracy, and often significantly, as shown through the
positive percent increases in Figure 3. The only case
with a negative percent increase corresponds to a very
weak attack that leaves the classifier achieving 98.2%
without defense. We also note that in case of such a
weak attack, using the considered single-architecture-type-
trained-defenses also worsens the accuracy compared to
2 Code available at https://codeocean.com/capsule/7339381/tree/v1
Fig. 3: Percent increase in accuracy improvements for
the MNIST-Digit dataset when using the ensemble-
architecture-type-trained defense. The numbers in paren-
theses after each scenario description indicate the follow-
ing: post-attack accuracy before defense, average accuracy
improvement when using the CW, DF and FGS traditional
defenses respectively.
(a) MNIST-Digit dataset. (b) CIFAR-10 dataset.
Fig. 4: Percent increases in accuracy improvements when
using an ensemble-attack-trained defense. The numbers in
parentheses after each scenario description indicate the
following: post-attack accuracy before defense, average
accuracy improvement when using traditional defenses.
the no-defense case. Hence it may be smarter to not use a
preprocessing defense when the attack is so weak.
With no attack, our ensemble-architecture-type-trained
defense decreases the accuracy improvement by not more
than 10.68%, and increases it by up to 37.7%.
3) Varying the Attack: Using our ensemble-attack-
trained defense generally yields an increase in accuracy
improvement compared to using the traditional defenses,
as shown in Figure 4. The only instance when this accuracy
improvement is negative is when a DeepFool attack is used
against the CIFAR-10 classification task. As earlier, this
negative accuracy improvement happens only when the
attack is weak.
With no attack, our ensemble-attack-trained defense
changes the accuracy improvement by +43.86% and -
510.12% for the MNIST-Digit and CIFAR-10 datasets,
respectively.
IV. Discussion
In our experiments, training the defense with an ensem-
ble of architecture types made a larger impact than train-
ing the defense with an ensemble of attacks. We believe
that this is because while generating attacks using different
algorithms, we adjusted the hyperparameters such that the
levels of perceptibility of the attacked images are similar.
In conclusion, if the attacker is constrained to limit the
perceptibility of the attack, then the choice of attack in
training the defense does not make a significant impact,
as evident from Figure 4.
We also observe that it is crucial for the attacker to
know the architecture type of the victim classifier, as
illustrated by the pre-defense accuracies in Figure 3. From
the defender’s perspective, if the attack is weak, it is in
their best interest to avoid using a pre-processing defense.
This makes it important to develop detection strategies
to determine how strong an attack is. During test-time, if
the attack is found to be weaker than a certain threshold,
using a pre-processing defense should be avoided to avoid
a decrease in accuracy. Other problems that we plan to
consider for future work include the case when the test
noise model cannot be included in training (see e.g., [24]),
creating adaptive defenses by classifying noise types (see
e.g., [25]) and creating a noise dictionary (see e.g., [26]),
as well as incorporating uncertainty prediction in the
defender’s model (see e.g., [27]).
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6Appendix
Details of Attack Generation
All attacks were generated using the TensorFlow Clever-
hans library and were untargeted attacks. For the MNIST-
Digit dataset, the CW attack was generated with 4 binary
search steps, a maximum of 60 iterations, a learning rate
of 0.1, a batch size of 10, an initial constant of 1.0, and the
abort_early parameter was set to True. For the CIFAR-
10 dataset, the CW attack was generated with 6 binary
search steps, a maximum of 10000 iterations, a learning
rate of 0.7, a batch size of 25, an initial constant of 0.001,
and the abort_early parameter was set to True.
Architecture of Denoising Autoencoders
The MNIST DAE has architecture FC-784-256-128-81-
128-256-784. There is no activation in any layer except the
last layer, which has sigmoid activation. The architecture
of the CIFAR-10 DAE is shown in Table 1
Conv 3x3x64, ReLU
Conv 3x3x32, ReLU
Max Pool 2x2
Conv 3x3x3, ReLU
Conv 3x3x32, ReLU
Upsampling 2x2
Conv 3x3x64, ReLU
Conv 3x3x64, Sigmoid
TABLE I: CIFAR-10 DAE architecture
Training Details of all Neural Networks
Table 2 shows the training details of all neural networks
used in this letter. The default values were used for all
hyperparameters not shown in the table.
Parameters MNIST FC MNIST CNN MNIST DAE CIFAR CNN CIFAR DAE
Loss Categorical Crossentropy Categorical Crossentropy MSE Categorical Crossentropy MSE
Optimizer Adam Adam Adam RMSprop Adam
Learning Rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Batch Size 200 200 200 64 256
Epochs 100 20 150 150 150
TABLE II: Training Parameters for the Neural Networks
